Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Relative clause, philosophy: the question here is about which functions and which statuses relative clauses have in comparison to other types of sentences. See also general terms, singular terms, abstract terms, subsets._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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W.V.O. Quine on Relative Clauses - Dictionary of Arguments
II 203 Relative clauses: (x:Fx) - but not: (Ey)(y=(x:Fx)) - that would testify existence of a class - here, mathematics goes beyond logic. >Existence statements. II 199 Class Name: is a singular term, indicating a class - placeholder class name: real. bindable variable whose values are classes - a relative clause is no class name. >Classes, >Proper names, >Proxy, >Singular terms. --- V 129 Relative clause/Quine: function: separating the object from what the sentence says of it. - A relative clause becomes a general term, if the relative pronoun is put in front (which stands for the name of the object): E.g. which I bought from the man who had found it. - The general term says the same as the original sentence. >General terms. GeachVs: instead understanding relative pronouns as "and he" or "if he" or "since he". Geach’s donkey: Whoever has a donkey, beats it: Solution/Geach: analysis of the relative pronoun who with "if he": every human being, if he has a donkey, be beats it. >Donkey sentences. V 133 Relative clause: can make a predication of the form a is P from every sentence on an object - E.g. Fido is such that I bought him from a man who had found him. Relative clause: has adjectival function here - substantivic: with thing, E.g. Fido is a thing such that ...-’ original form: useful when a relative clause functions as a general term. - E.g. in the universal categorical sentence (Construction) [an a is a b], [each a is a b]. >Predication, >Adjectives. Universal categorical sentence: no predication but a coupling of two general terms._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |